Abstract This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the bilateral alternating-o¤ers model, a single optimization program signi…cantly reduces the computational burden. Furthermore, water prices and property rights result from exploiting the Second Welfare Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) . Directions for future research are provided.
Introduction
The international community has come to recognize that fresh water is scarce, witness the declarations at the Dublin Conference in 1992, the UN conference Johannesburg 2002 and the past tri-annual World Water Forums starting in 1997 and its fourth meeting March 2006. It is generally felt that the problem is not so much physical scarcity, as ine¢ cient use and resource management and vested interests, in particular in case of the World's many international rivers. In some regions, ‡ooding and pollution pose serious threats, whereas in water stressed regions, lack of agreement on how to share river waters and underground aquifers are a serious source of potentially violent con ‡ict. claims by upstream countries of owing the water caught on its territory (absolute territorial sovereignty), con…scating headwaters by geopolitics or downstream nation's claims of 'historical rights'(unlimited territorial integrity), see e.g., Ambec and Sprumont (2002) . Rather, international law states that the nations involved should mutually agree on sharing the river through negotiations, but it is left in the middle to what extend unilateral decisions can be made in the absence of agreement. Such negotiations are often deadlocked, because almost all governments in water stressed regions became aware of the water issues after having experienced serious shortages of water and a simple reshu-ing of water is perceived as a 'zero sum'game where giving up water is regarded as unacceptable. Unless politics either deepen or broaden the water agenda, the situation is most likely to stay put or might even deteriorate ending in con ‡ict.
Coalition formation, the division of gains within coalitions and unilateral decisions prior to the negotiations, threats traditionally belong to the realm of game theory, which is also recognized by global institutions involved in river management such as the World Bank, e.g. Carraro et al. (2005a,b) . These references also contain an extensive overview of the many documented researches in economics and game theory addressing the water issue. However, these surveys also recognize that there are only three applications of formal negotiation theory in which negotiation procedures are explicitly modelled: Rausser and Simon (1992) , Thoyer et al. (2001) and Simon et al. (2001) . In these three references, a …nite horizon is taken as a proxy for the …xed-point problem characterizing the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of their in…nite-horizon bargaining game, because numerically solving …xed-point problems is computationally di¢ cult.
Although it is eminent that game theory o¤ers a methodology to address water issues, the game theoretic profession did not seem to respond to the critique in Dinar et al. (1992) : stakeholders and policy makers are reluctant to game-theoretic transfers that are not related to water prices and, second, game theoretic solutions impose a huge computational burden upon the applied modeler. The computational burden in water issues arises because the physical economic problem has to be transformed into the so-called "utility-space", represented by the characteristic function form, before any of the game theoretic concepts can be applied and, then, requires a translation back into the original physical formulation. Also the computation of game theoretic concepts in utility space, especially …xed-point problems, adds to the complexity. This criticism still stands today. 3 The …rst critique goes beyond the lack of water prices. Since most existing international treaties, such as the Jordan-Israeli Peace Accords of 1994, are formulated in terms of minimal transboundary ‡ows, water quality and …nancial transfers, this hints at that the framing of negotiation theory should be preferably close to physical variables and notions understood by negotiation parties. Roemer (1988) was among the …rst to demonstrate how our understanding of two axiomatic bargaining solutions, including the one proposed in Nash (1950) , bene…ts from taking physical reality as the primitive.
Recent theoretical work by Houba (2005a,b) for the alternating-o¤ers model in Rubin- stein (1982) provides a promising way to e¤ectively deal with the critique in Dinar et al. (1992) . The bilateral case seems restrictive, but extends to multilateral negotiations requiring unanimity among all parties. The innovations are twofold.
First, the …xed-point problem characterizing the equilibrium proposals in the alternatingo¤ers model is formulated directly in terms of physical variables and can be solved by computing the optimum of a single maximization problem for which excellent software is available. 4 Of course, every …xed point problem f (x) = x can be reformulated as minimization of (f (x) x) 2 and this square is minimized at every …xed point x of the function f . However, even for relatively small problems such procedure is known to be numerically cumbersome and might not produce any solution at all. The innovation in Houba (2005a,b ) is a different reformulation that does allow for a robust numerical implementation. Furthermore, this method is computationally superior to methods relying on truncating the horizon. The objective of the single program is the same asymmetric Nash product as …rst reported in Binmore et al. (1986) for instantaneously fast negotiations and this insight therefore extends to time-consuming or sluggish negotiations. The bargaining weights provide a theoretical measure for bargaining power in sluggish negotiations.
Second, this single program generates the player-dependent Pareto-e¢ cient proposals.
Therefore, the Second Welfare Theorem applies: Every Pareto e¢ cient allocation can be regarded as a Walrasian equilibrium with Walrasian market prices and suitable …nancial transfers. This provides a sound underpinning of the game theoretic solution in terms of water prices. Moreover, for every equilibrium proposals, these Walrasian prices coincide with the shadow prices in the optimal solution of the single program and these prices are automatically generated by the optimization software. The suitable …nancial transfers are equal to the di¤erence in monetary value of the disagreement situation and the situation arising from agreement, both evaluated against the market prices. These transfers can be interpreted as transfers of property rights. This interpretation is well understood in 4 For example, GAMS is popular in applied economics, see www.gams.com.
General Equilibrium models, but novel to game theory. Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) modelling is popular in applied economics and formulated in physical variables that are close to the policy makers' concerns and understanding. The AGE framework is ‡exible to accommodate sectors or regions in and across economies as well as extensions involving uncertainty and dynamics, see e.g., Ginsburgh and Keyzer (2002) . Therefore, this framework is of relevance in modelling water related problems, as will be demonstrated for the bilateral version of the river basin management model proposed in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) .
Finally, this reinterpretation of Pareto e¢ ciency assumes non-transferable utility in dealing with the negotiation problem instead of the more restrictive transferable utility This paper discusses the relevance of the results obtained for exchange economies in Houba (2005a,b) in dealing with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992) . First, the results for exchange economies are surveyed in Section 2. Then, production is added in the subsequent section. The Second Welfare Theorem, Walrasian equilibrium prices and transfers of property rights are discussed in Section 4. The bilateral version of the river basin model in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) in Section 5 serves as an illustration of the type of insights available for river basin management. Directions for future research are delegated to the …nal section.
Alternating O¤ers and the Single Program
The well-known alternating-o¤ers model in Rubinstein (1982) is formulated in terms of the division of a single dollar or single issue. It is a standard result that, under certain assumptions, this model admits a unique SPE in stationary strategies in which the responding player is kept indi¤erent between accepting the equilibrium proposal and the equilibrium continuation after rejection. Furthermore, the assumption of a single issue can be easily replaced by simultaneous negotiations on multiple issues, for example consumption bundles in an exchange economy.
The alternating-o¤ers model also allows for an interpretation of negotiations over an in…nite stream of single dollars with discounting under stationary contracts, as pioneered by Fernandez and Glazer (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) To establish minimal notation, we consider an extension of the alternating-o¤ers model in Rubinstein (1982) in which each of two agents discounts his per-period utility from a sequence of consumption bundles in an in…nite stream of exchange economies (without stock variables). The exchange economy consists of two agents, called countries, are indexed i = 1; 2. The economy has n 2 commodities, monotonic and concave utility functions
for country i and total
We assume that z = (! 1 ; ! 2 ) is Pareto ine¢ cient meaning that 5 We could allow for ! 1 + ! 2 ! that would describe cases where cumulative property rights over several underdeveloped resources are less than is physically feasible. For example, the Israeli-Jordan Peace Treaty of 1994 further develops the excess seasonal ‡ows of the Yarmuck River. the bargaining problem below is essential. Exchange economies form a special class of AGE models, see e.g., Ginsburgh and Keyzer (2002) .
We regard exchange economies as multi-issue negotiation problems. Initial endowments or property rights are typically ill-de…ned in river basin management. In Section 5, we address the origin of these initial endowments in such situations and, until then, we assume these are given. The feasibility constraint is better known as the aggregate commodity balance and, whenever embedded in the single program, its shadow prices will play an important role in the application of the Second Welfare Theorem discussed in Section 4. In river basin management, it includes the so-called water balances that are determined by the hydrological experts, see e.g., Albersen et al. (2003) .
Time is discrete and indexed by t 2 N. The feasible allocation in period t is denoted as z t = (z 1;t ; z 2;t ). The subject of the negotiations is a feasible allocation z = (z 1 ; z 2 ) that should be understood as an everlasting, binding and stationary contract, i.e., f(z 1; ; z 2;t )g 1 =0 with z i; = z i for both i and period = 0 being the …rst period that the contract is implemented.
In every period t 2 N prior to agreement, each country consumes z i;t = ! i . This means that country i's disagreement utility is given by d i = u i (! i ), i = 1; 2. Country i's utility from T 0 periods of disagreement followed by agreement on z = (z 1 ; z 2 ) is given by
where i 2 (0; 1) is country i's discount factor. Furthermore, each constraint is binding.
At t odd, country 1 proposes the feasible allocation and, then, country 2 accepts or rejects. Accept ends the negotiations. If rejected, then each country i consumes ! i before the negotiations move to the next (even) round. At t even, the countries'roles are reversed.
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfectness (SPE).
It is a well-known result that the alternating o¤ers model admits a unique SPE in stationary strategies (SSPE), see for a survey e.g., Muthoo (1999) and Houba and Bolt (2002) . Stationary strategies prescribe country-dependent feasible allocations denoted as x = (x 1 ; x 2 ), respectively, y = (y 1 ; y 2 ) for country 1 and 2. In such SSPE, accept y is a best response for country 1 if and only if u 1 (y 1 ) (1
. Similarly, accept x is a best response for country 2 if and only if u 2 (x 2 ) (1
. Taking these equilibrium conditions and the feasibility constraints into account, we have that any pair of SSPE allocations (x; y) simultaneously solves the following pair of convex programs as a …xed point:
where y 2 , respectively, x 1 are exogenous in (1) and (2). Both x and y are Pareto e¢ cient.
Of greater signi…cance is the equivalence between any …xed point (x; y) of (1)- (2) and the solution to a single convex program, as …rst established in Houba (2005b) . The equivalence is based upon the observation that any pair of SSPE allocations, the proposed allocations x and y have the same asymmetric Nash product associated with the bargaining weight = ln 2 = (ln 1 + ln 2 ) 1 for country 1. To see this, note that
and, because
This asymmetric Nash product is the objective function in the single program. The constraints in the single program are obtained by combining the constraints in (1) and (2).
However, a minor modi…cation is needed, because the endogeniety of both y 2 and x 1 in each second inequality constraint in (1) and (2) would violate the convexity of the program. The convexity can be restored by introducing the additional variables s i , i = 1; 2, replacing the utility functions u 1 (x 1 ) and u 2 (y 2 ) in these constraints and the Nash product at the costs of adding the additional constraints s 2 u 2 (y 2 ) and s 1 u 1 (x 1 ). Then, the single convex program is given by
where p x and p y denote vectors of shadow prices. The following result states the equivalence of the …xed point (1) and (2) with program (3), which is the main result in Houba (2005b) .
Proposition 1 (s 1 ; s 2 ; x ; y ) is a solution of (3) if and only if (x; y) = (x ; y ) is a pair of SSPE allocations to (1)- (2).
Remark 1 Reinterpretation of the n commodities in (3) can represent nonstationary contracts. Suppose the k-th component represents consumption of, say, water or money at period k. Then, the contract distinguishes consumption of a single commodity in n di¤erent periods. A normalized and constant stream of this single commodity would correspond to ! k = 1.
Discounted utility over these n periods can be captured by introducing some per-period utility functionû i : R + ! R and rede…ning the utility function In the optimum, all constraints are binding. Therefore,
imply that the additional variables represent the SSPE utility levels for country i in the role of the proposer. Since the program is convex, the Maximum Theorem implies that the shadow prices p x and p y are nonnegative. Program (3) lends itself for implementation in many of the optimization packages available today, such as e.g., GAMS. Since this program is convex, these packages o¤er robust computational algorithms designed to e¢ ciently compute an accurate numerical approximation of the unique optimum. This almost exact numerical solution is superior to approximation of the …xed point of (1)- (2) Therefore, these can be implemented by less variables and constraints and solved as
So, the additional computational costs, in terms of additional variables and constraints, of solving (3) for sluggish negotiations instead of (4) for instantaneous negotiations amounts to n + 2 variables and n + 4 constraints, of which n are linear.
The bargaining problem in utility representation
Houba (2005a) establishes similar results for convex bargaining problems in the utility representation. This has relevant theoretical value, because every bilateral negotiation problem that can be transformed into such convex bargaining problem can also be solved with a single convex program. Furthermore, it also provides valuable insights for non-convex bargaining problems.
Formally, a bargaining problem in utility representation is denoted as the pair (S; d) with S 2 R 2 the nonempty, compact set of feasible utility pairs and d 2 S the disagreement point.
The curve s i = f i (s j ), i; j = 1; 2, i 6 = j, describes the Pareto frontier of S.
Any pair (s 1 ; s 2 ) of SSPE utilities simultaneously solves the following pair of programs as a …xed point:
Each program implies that the proposing country maximizes his own utility among the set of feasible and acceptable utility pairs. In each optimum, both constraints are binding. Houba Proposition 2 Let S be a convex set. Then, (s 1 ; s 2 ) is the unique pair of SSPE utilities of (5-(6) if and only if
This proposition partly extends to the class of bargaining problems in utility representation that are strongly comprehensive or 'non-convex'as in Herrero (1989) . Then, Program (7) always yields a pair of SSPE allocations, because in the optimum both constraints are binding. However, the reverse may not hold as Herrero (1989) shows: Uniqueness of the pair of SSPE utilities (s 1 ; s 2 ) may break down and multiple non-stationary SPE strategies may exist as well. The Nash product associated to di¤erent pairs of SSPE utility pairs (s 1 ; s 2 ) are also di¤erent and may be less than the maximal attainable Nash product. For instantaneous negotiations, the (limit) pair of SSPE utilities (s 1 ; s 2 ) in program (7) coincides with the maximal Nash product as axiomatized in Kaneko (1980) . The limit set of all SSPE utilities of (5)- (6) is axiomatized in Herrero (1989) . What is needed for uniqueness in (non-stationary) SPE strategies is the stronger uniqueness in …xed points of (5)-(6).
Production
The results for exchange economies might seem of limited interest for applied economics.
The aim of this and later sections is to show the merits in applications. In this section, we address how to incorporate production.
Extending the exchange economy to allow for production activities is conceptually straightforward, see e.g. Varian (1984) . Production plans require inputs from the economy in order to produce outputs. These are represented in a single vector q 2 R n with positive and negative elements, where positive (negative) elements represent outputs (inputs). Production Since we later discuss bilateral river basin management in which the economy of each riparian country involves water related production, we assume that water related production is carried out by many small producers that are mainly active in one country. For explanatory reasons, we aggregate all producers in one country by assuming one production set for each country. 6 So, each country exclusively controls some production technology and country i's production plan is a vector q i 2 Q i . The subject of the negotiations becomes a feasible allocation z = (z 1 ; z 2 ; q 1 ; q 2 ) meaning that
where negative components of either q 1 or q 2 lower the amount of that particular good available for consumption. The aggregate commodity balance implies that the demand for 6 If not, we would have the index set J i of producers in country i and q j 2 Q j for every j 2 J i . In the text, we assume J i = fig. each good is at most equal to its supply. In that respect, it would be natural to also include the demand for inputs on the left-hand side, but it is standard to have one vector per producer representing the possibly negative net output on the right-hand side of this balance. As mentioned, we describe country i's production set Q i by the transformation
In case of convex production technologies, we immediately have that the bargaining problem in utility representation is also convex, see e.g., Roemer (1988) , and, hence, the equivalence stated in Proposition 2 immediately applies. Also in terms of the economic environment, the equivalence between the …xed point problem and program (3) 
0:
Of course, these modi…cations must also be made to obtain the modi…ed program (3), which we omit.
Nonconvex production technologies can be implemented in the same manner. However, such technologies cause a breakdown of the convexity of the modi…ed program (3), because such technologies are known to give rise to nonconvex bargaining problem in utility representation. As argued for the utility representation in Section 2, the theoretical results only partly extend. Its counterpart for program (3) with nonconvex production reads: The maximum of the modi…ed single program (3) corresponds to one of possibly multiple SSPE strategies. The SSPE speci…ed by this program is special in that it has the largest Nash product.
The modi…ed program (3) with production can also be implemented in optimization software by modifying all commodity balances and adding twice (i.e., once for each proposal) all variables and constraints concerning production. Under convex production technologies, the software returns the unique optimum. However, for nonconvex programs it is fundamentally unclear whether a local or global optimum is found, even though most packages o¤er robust algorithms. Nevertheless, although this is a fundamental problem of any numeric optimization, it will be clear that the numerical solution returned, whether it is the global or a local optimum, has properties that are consistent with SSPE behavior.
Market Prices and Property Rights
This paper is motivated by the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992) , who report on the di¢ culties arising from applying cooperative game theory to several small-scale water issues. They state: "Clearly, the potential for additional income due to cooperation is higher when side payments are possible. However, the soundness of such transfers with no a prior reference to the price per unit of water may be questioned, especially considering the general resentment of farmers to adopt side payments as a policy." Since side payments or transfers are advocated by (cooperative) Game Theory as the universal remedy towards cooperation, the game theoretic society should treat this critique very seriously.
In this section, we discuss the merits of the Second Welfare Theorem in General Equilibrium modelling in dealing with this fundamental issue. Since (cooperative) game theory developed autonomously from microeconomics, it does not refer to nor does it exploit the implications of the Second Welfare Theorem. For that reason, we discuss these implications in detail before turning our attention to bilateral river basin management in the next section.
The Second Welfare Theorem for economies with production states: Any Pareto e¢ cient allocation is attainable as a price quasi-equilibrium or Walrasian equilibrium with transfers, see e.g., Varian (1984) , Mas-Colell et al. (1995) and Ginsburgh and Keyzer (2002) . MasColell et al. (1995) show that this theorem holds under convex and locally nonsatiated preferences and convex production technologies. The transfers can be achieved through many appropriate physical reallocations of the initial endowments or through …nancial lumpsum transfers evaluated against the Walrasian equilibrium prices. In terms of a Walrasian economy, these transfers take place before price-taking behavior by all agents and such behavior ensures that the law of supply and demand will lead to the Walrasian equilibrium prices supporting the Pareto e¢ cient allocation under consideration. The Walrasian prices can also be obtained as the shadow prices of a welfare program. The single program (3) can be seen as a welfare program associated with the Nash social welfare function as axiomatized in Kaneko (1982) . The implication to water management is clear: Pareto e¢ cient allocations can be reinterpreted in terms of lump-sum …nancial transfers and supporting water prices.
In further discussing these issues, we consider country 1's SSPE proposal The Walrasian equilibrium prices suggest the possibility to decentralize all consumer and producer decisions through markets and suitable taxation. In river basin management, introducing water markets is often advocated as a solution to inadequate water management.
Of course, whether it is advisable to do so should depend upon whether or not these agents have market power to manipulate market prices, which is a separate matter and outside the realm of the Walrasian model.
Bilateral Joint River Basin Management
The previous sections established that the single program can be implemented in economies with production and that each SSPE proposal can be interpreted as a Walrasian equilibrium with equilibrium prices. In this section, we illustrate the potentials of this framework to bilateral river basin management in a two-country version of the model proposed in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) .
Consider a river that runs through two countries, where country 1 lies upstream of country 2 and all water users within the same country are aggregated as a single consumer. A more detailed model would allow for explicit production and water users that di¤er in their spatial location, representing di¤erent regions or cities, and di¤er in their use, such as agriculture, industrial and domestic. The territory of country i, i = 1; 2, captures e i > 0 of water that is available for use. The subject of the negotiations concerns the allocation of water and an explicit …nancial transfer. Therefore, each country derives utility from consuming water and from holding money. Country i's utility from consuming z i of water and the possibly negative transfer t i is given by u i (z i ; t i ) = b i (z i ) + t i , where b i is monotonically increasing, homogenous (b i (0) = 0), di¤erentiable and strictly concave. The function b i can also be regarded as an implicitly described production technology that can be separated as described in Section 4 at the cost of an additional variable and constraint. Following Ambec and Sprumont (2002) , money is transferred utility meaning that the two-country economy does not have initial holdings of money. Total endowments are ! = (e 1 ; e 2 ; 0).
In terms of economic goods, the model distinguishes between good 1 representing water that is physically located in country 1, good 2 representing water located in country 2 and good 3 representing money. In Walrasian economies, each consumer expresses a demand for each of the available goods, but in case of rivers country 1 cannot consume good 2 and country 2 cannot consume good 1. To minimize on subscripts and superscripts, we continue denoting country i's consumption of good i simply as z i .
Since water disposed of by country 1 ‡ows downhill and transforms good 1 into good 2
we should see the river as a giant production process governed by physical processes. In the model under consideration, the river accumulates e 2 on country 2's territory and, therefore, the river production of downhill water between "locations" 1 and 2 takes place on country 1's territory. So, it is country 1 that produces good 2 with good 1 as input. Although some countries spend a signi…cant proportion of the gross national income on pumping water uphill, such as Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan, we refrain from pumping as in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) . We only note that pumping should be treated as a production process.
In the present setup, country 2 cannot produce good 1.
With respect to production of good 2, country 1 produces q 2 from input q 1 and, under costless transformation, we have q 1 + q 2 0 and q 1 0, which implies a convex production technology. The aggregate commodity balance is given by
where p 1 , p 2 and p 3 refer to the shadow prices for the three goods. Consumption of z 1 e 1 by country 1 and e¢ ciency in production implies q 2 = q 1 = e 1 z 1 0. Substitution yields the mathematically equivalent feasibility constraints in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) :
In terms of the latter balance, the subject of the negotiations is a feasible allocation (z 1 ; z 2 ; t 1 ; t 2 ).
The allocation should be extended to also include q 1 and q 2 if river "production" is explicitly incorporated, which is would be the convenient approach in applications where the hydro- The bargaining frontier, the disagreement point (b (e 1 ) ; b 2 (e 2 )) and the set of individual rational payo¤s (IR). The aspiration levels (b (e 1 ) ; b 2 (e 1 + e 2 )) are infeasible.
logical part of the model is provided by hydrologists.
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The disagreement point
An essential ingredient of any bargaining problem is the disagreement point. For water issues, there is some modelling freedom in the choice of such point. An obvious choice is a disagreement point based upon property rights according to international law. An alternative choice for the disagreement point would be to assumes that this point is based upon the countries'unilateral decisions concerning water issues. We discuss both alternatives.
Suppose in modeling water issues we opt for a disagreement point based upon international law. As Ambec and Sprumont (2002) argue, international law is ambiguous and they discuss two con ‡icting doctrines. One of these doctrines is absolute territorial sovereignty and it assigns e i as the property rights for country i and the river's production technology to country 1. This would imply ! 1 = (e 1 ; 0; 0), ! 2 = (0; e 2 ; 0) and the disagreement point
). This point is always feasible, because
In order to have an essential bargaining problem, the inequality has to be strict. Another 8 In terms of Section 4, we have z 1 = (z 1 ; 0; t 1 ), q 1 = (q 1 ; q 2 ; 0) 2 Q 1 = q 1 jq 1 0; q 2 q 1 j , z 2 = (0; z 2 ; t 2 ) and q 2 2 Q 2 = f0g.
doctrine is unlimited territorial integrity that assigns incompatible property rights to the countries, namely e 1 to country 1 and e 1 + e 2 to country 2. Also, the river's production technology accrues to country 2. This would translate into ! 1 = (e 1 ; 0; 0), ! 2 = (0; e 1 + e 2 ; 0) and the disagreement point d = (b 1 (e 1 ) ; b 2 (e 1 + e 2 )). This point is not feasible, because
This disagreement point is physically unattainable and, as suggested by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) , can only be interpreted as the countries'aspiration levels. In case both countries are committed to these "virtual" aspiration levels, then the negotiations remain deadlocked
and disagreement is the only outcome, see e.g. Crawford (1982) and Muthoo (1992) . Figure   1 illustrates both doctrines.
As an alternative modelling approach that seems closer to reality, we may assume that each country takes unilateral decisions concerning water issues in the absence of bilateral river basin management. In terms of noncooperative bargaining theory, the disagreement point is endogenous. Several theoretical models are available, see e.g. Houba (1998), Busch and Wen (1995) and Houba (1997) . 9 These bargaining models also assume the model under consideration as the disagreement game in which both countries take unilateral decisions.
Under SSPE behavior and the impossibility of commitment to disagreement actions prior to the negotiations, the disagreement point coincides with a Nash equilibrium, which is (z i ; t i ) = (e i ; 0), i = 1; 2, in our case. This Nash equilibrium coincides with absolute territorial sovereignty. Although international law suggests that countries should mutually agree on Pareto improvements through negotiations, this law seems to lack a doctrine how to treat unilateral decisions in absence of agreement.
The Second Welfare Theorem and water pricing
The purpose of discussing this particular model is to arrive at water prices, money trans-fers and transfers of property rights through taxation. The interesting case assumes the nontrivial case in which the disagreement point corresponds to absolute territorial sovereignty: 
where all Greek symbols between brackets denote shadow prices. As in Section 4, we only discuss country 1's SSPE proposal (x 1 ; x 2 ; q 
Solving these equations yields
because utility is strictly increasing in money and, therefore, p x 3 > 0. Due to speci…cities of the model, we obtain the special case of a uniform water price for each location. From (12) we observe that only relative prices matter and we may take money as the numeraire by dividing all shadow prices by p x 3 , where we denote the normalized (uniform) water price as
Assuming that the bargaining problem is essential, i.e., Pareto improvements exist as depicted in Figure 1 , the total gains from bilateral river basin management are maximized if the upstream country is willing to trade some of its water for money. Since also all shadow prices are positive, we must have that all constraints are binding, including e¢ cient river production. So, q x 1 = x 1 e 1 < 0 and q (12) implies that the joint surplus b 1 (x 1 ) + b 2 (x 2 ) is maximized in this SSPE proposal and, hence, x 1 coincides with the unique maximizer of the right-hand side of (11), as could be expected. Finally, t 
which yields
is also country i's marginal rate of substitution between water and money and it is equal to the relative price p This implies a unit price of water of (e 1 x 1 ) =t 1 that is unrelated to do prices related to marginal costs and bene…ts. Note that it does not matter whether t i represents money or some consumption good from which the countries obtain utility. Since the SSPE proposal is individually rational, we obtain that t 
Next, consider producer 1 with its constant-returns-of-scale river production technology.
Producer 1's pro…t under price-taking is equal to 0, because he buys input q 1 = x 1 e 1 < 0 against price p x w and sells exactly this amount at exactly the same price to country 2. We refer to Albersen et al. (2003) for an example of non-trivial …nancial accounts based upon shadow pricing associated with non-convex physical processes.
Although money is usually regarded as a special economic good, it is just one of the goods in the economy, also according to the Second Welfare Theorem. This theorem provides an interpretation of the allocation (x 1 ; x 2 ; q In general, the Second Welfare Theorem deals with non-transferable utility instead of transferable utility or money, as e.g., in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) . For the bilateral case, the transferable utility value of cooperation, denoted as v (1; 2), is equal to the right-hand side of (10). The Pareto frontier is described by f i ((1 j ) d j + j s j ) = v (1; 2) (1 j ) d j j s j .
Then, direct application of program (2) In this program, any reference to prices and marginal bene…ts has vanished from the model description. In this simple case, this crucial information can be retrieved from (10), but for less transparent applications a holistic approach in physical variables as in e.g. Roemer (1988) yields more information to policy makers.
Finally, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) suggest that rational countries should realize that their joint maximal aspiration level is bounded by the maximum on the right-hand side of (10) indicates that it is very unlikely that this axiomatic solution will prevail. Furthermore, even at = 0 the Second Welfare Theorem applies.
We conclude this section with a remark on stock variables.
Remark 2 Optimal river basin management includes the optimal release and recharge of lakes and dams as reservoirs of water. Reservoirs would introduce stock variables to the model. A reservoir can also be seen as a production process that produces "future" water from "current" water and it can be represented as before by some production set Q. As an illustration, reinterpret z 1 , respectively, z 2 as water at present and in the future, say the wet and dry season. Then, the reservoir produces future water q 2 from present water q 1 as input and, under absence of evaporation, we have q 1 + q 2 0 and q 1 0 as before. Then q 1 is the end stock of period 1 and q 2 the initial stock at period 2.
Concluding Remark
This contribution deals with the two points of fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992) that alienate game theory from the language and concerns of policy makers: Easy to implement solutions that are based upon common notions of water pricing; and insight in the gains and losses for every stakeholder from policy reforms toward e¢ cient river basin management. For bilateral negotiations modeled as alternating-o¤ers, as pioneered in Rubinstein (1982) , a powerful computational innovation in a physical representation of real-world issues is available that simultaneously allows for an interpretation of water prices as Walrasian equilibrium prices, which is a direct consequence of the Second Welfare Theorem. Unfortunately, the utility representation in Game Theory washes away any notion of water prices from the physical model, as illustrated in Section 5. The physical model can be regarded as the popular AGE framework that allows for further di¤erentiation of water users, water related production and consumption goods by time (within the hydrological cycle), by space and uncertainty about extreme whether conditions (droughts and ‡oodings), although the latter would assume the existence of contingent contracts and a discrete number of events.
Identifying water prices as Walrasian equilibrium prices should not be mistaken as naively suggesting to decentralize decisions through water markets. For that to be the best policy recommendation, it should be made clear …rst that all participants on these markets do not posses signi…cant market power. For river basin management, also the role of governments is crucial even in case these do not trade themselves on the water market, because upstream countries might initiate development of plans for, say, expanding the area under irrigation a¤ecting future downstream ‡ows.
Although this paper identi…es a promising route for further developing tools for water policy research, the bilateral case is just a …rst step. Future research should …rst of all be directed to deal with coalition formation among countries or among di¤erent stakeholder within and across countries. Also the issue of regulating water markets when some the parties have market power is a relevant issue. As in all areas of economic policy, lobbying is
